I N T RODUC T ION
Following democratic transition in 1998, Indonesia began its transformation toward a process of social protection universalization that was marked by the enactment of the National Social Security System (Sistem Jaminan Sosial Nasional-SJSN) Act No. 40 of 2004, which was followed by the implementation of the Social Security Administrative Body (Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial-BPJS) in 2014. Nevertheless, both theoretical and empirical studies on Indonesian welfare regime still received scant attention. Some studies on welfare regime in Indonesia (Croissant 2004; Gough 2013; Ramesh 2000; Torheim 2013; Tribowo & Bahagijo 2006; Sumarto 2017) were mostly confined to a politicaleconomical approach that stressed the dynamics of a macro economy and the shift of political power as the determinant factor in constructing social policy characteristics. Consequently, in-depth discussion on the citizenship approach as an inherent alternative within the discussion on welfare regime in Indonesia was eventually disregarded. A citizenship approach offers a contextual analysis that examines a comprehensive range of factors, including values, ideational perspectives, and the notions of people's everyday lives as a critical part of the social order that collectively represents ethical considerations in the contexts of social policy-making and its implementation. Specifically, the citizenship analysis in this article is positioned as the analytical framework for identifying how a state visualizes its citizens, followed by discussions on power relationships constructed between the state and its citizens. Those two substances correlated with the state's expressions related to the fulfillment of citizen's rights, including social protection.
This article aims to reconstruct ideas of social citizenship in social welfare distribution in a domestic context. I began with the hypothesis which states that the main problem with transformation of welfare regime in Indonesia might not be with how far it can actually go to bring fundamental changes to the citizens to access their social rights, but on to what extent this transformation has gained legitimacy from society in everyday life. As a matter of fact, the mainstreaming of social citizenship claimed to have been achieved through the universal coverage system encounters some resistance from non-state institutions that are attributed to discourses of communitarian and market citizenship.
In reflecting on an empirical case: a number of citizens who demand their social protection rights, yet who are reluctant to participate and contribute to the BPJS scheme, caused a financial deficit problem. This case was not only about pragmatic citizens, as most normative assumptions would claim, but it is also about the absence of willingness by citizens to entrust social risks management to the government. To obtain detailed illustrations ofthe absence of willingness, we must investigate the genealogy of Indonesian welfare regime since Soeharto's reign , wherein it was attributed by political process and the economic system as historical components that constructed discourses of market and communitarian citizenship in the context of social protection. Adaptations of market and communitarian citizenship had shaped path-dependency for many years (Hall & Taylor 1996) . This situation became an endogenous factor that hampered the transformation of the welfare regime toward a universal model. In fact, the transformation required individuals to convert their former imaginary citizenship status into social citizenship. This translates into the status coming with requirements to "willingly" divert from "family/community"and "private insurance companies" to the state in the form of compulsory dues. Of course, this is not an easy task. In European welfare states, converts of imaginary citizenship status to social citizenship were 'completed' during the industrialization period (Marshall 2009 ). This argument is supported by some studies (Esping-Andersen 1999; 1990; Cox 2004; Gough 2004; that confirm the existence of cross-class coalitions in supporting and maintaining universal social protection programs provided by the state. The advent of this class coalition is based on along historical genealogy as well as on different contexts compared to developing countries (Gough 2004; Pierson 2001) . To gain further understanding of this topic, I will examine how the citizenship approach contributes to the wider-ranging welfare regime discussion by reviewing the East Asia and South East Asia welfare regime models as a loop to look at Indonesian cases.
R E SE A RC H M E T HOD
The main objective of this article is to reconstruct ideas of social citizenship in social welfare distribution in a domestic context (specifically in Indonesia). Data for this study were collected using a systematic review method. This method is a quality-focused approach to summarizing the existing empirical evidence in response to the main research objective (Petticrew & Roberts 2008) . This method is especially useful for reviewing and synthesizing perspectives in order to highlight future research agendas and develop theoretical advancements that will allow us to understand the complex relationship between welfare provision and citizenship within the context of developing countries.
W E L FA R E R E G I M E A N D C I T I Z E NS H I P

The C oncept and D evel opment of Welfare Regime in Ea st A sian and S outh Ea st A sian C ount ries
Welfare regime describes a set of institutional arrangements in political, economic, and social fields that influence how public goods are produced and managed through a constellation of welfare actors for later be distributed in the form of social policy within a particular welfare system (Gough 2004; Powell & Barrientos 2004; Taylor-Gooby 1991) . A study on welfare regime was initially proposed by Gøst Esping-Andersen (1990), in his influential book entitled The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Esping-Andersen classifies welfare regime into three typologies: social-democratic, liberal-Anglo Saxon, and corporatist. Nevertheless, Esping-Andersen's typology has been a significant area of debate in and beyond European and Northern American continental territories. Especially in Asia, its democratic institutions, values systems, and capitalistic models have different historical genealogies (Walker & Wong 2005; Fleckenstein & Lee 2017; Gough 2004; Holiday & Wilding 2003; Hong 2008) . For example, it includes the social solidarity principle without equality, the growing patron-client politics, laissez-faire without libertarianism, and the development of household economy-based capitalism (Jones 1993; Papadopoulos & Roumpakis 2017) .
In addition, informal institutions, such as kinship-based institutions, still hold an alternative role that goes hand in hand with state and market institutions as the basis of social welfare provision (Chan 2008; Walker & Wong 2005; Shin & Shaw 2003; Croissant 2004) . These cases can be illustrated briefly by looking at the East Asian region (Japan, South Korea, China, and Hong Kong SAR) and in some parts of South East Asian region (Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia. and Indonesia) . One of the fundamental ideas on social policy within these areas is productivist welfare regime (Aspalter 2006; Holiday & Wilding 2003; Powell & Barrientos 2004; Walker & Wong 2005) . According to this body of literature, social policy was utilized as a supporting component of economic development, including development of the business and investment climate, as well as building political legitimacy and loyalty toward the regime in power. To support the status-quo, the government weakened the labor union (Holiday 2000) . The prominent characteristics of this regime include the very low allocation of public expenditure toward welfare programs, with a focus on health and education as a social investment to boost producti-vity and participation in the labor market (Aspalter 2006; Cook & Kwon 2007) . The social protection provided is segmented among a variety of social groups, such as military and civil servants, while for non-governmental employees, the social protection scheme focuses on two mechanisms: market provision and a family-or community-based scheme. Market provision is based on limited social insurance or provident funds, while a family-or community-based scheme works through redistribution and reciprocity.
The formative element of welfare regime discussed earlier is still related to the domination of traditional values, such as Confucianism (Cook & Kwon 2007; Jones 1993) , which is strongly rooted in the structure of Asian society. One of the emphases is on institutionalized obedience toward hierarchies, collectivism, and kinship that exists in Asian society's social structure. This basic principle appears to be the constructor of the power relationship between the state and its citizens, which also places the state leader as high as a deputy God, while the citizens must be loyal and obedient to the government. Besides, these very patriarchal Confucian principles (Shin & Shaw 2003) have also legitimized the strong dependency on family as the provider of social welfare services and social services provided by housewives (Cook & Kwon 2007) . In its later development, welfare regime in Asia experienced a discourse shift from productivist welfare to universal, redistributive, and inclusive welfare after the global monetary crisis in 1997-1998. This shift was also encouraged by intense dissemination of the discourse Millennium Development Goals (now converted to Sustainable Development Goals/SDGs) injected globally viainternational agency (Kühner 2015; Mok & Hudson 2014) . In the context of Indonesia, the emergence of SJSN, which later on was implemented in BPJS, "is a mark of a critical shift in Indonesian welfare regime toward the universal model" (Yuda 2018:9) , within the current of German corporatism.
Welfare regime and the const r u ction of citiz enship discourse
Many forms of welfare regime embraced by a state in its practice of social policy making can be seen as a basis of epistemology to identify. First, how a state visualizes its citizens? Second, what kind of citizenship is being constructed? These two issues will eventually influence the power relationship constructed between the state and its citizens, as well as the way the state regards citizens' rights and the fulfillment procedures completed through instruments of social policy.
The discussion on citizenship concepts will typically refer to Th. Marshall, a scholar who succeeded in providing a comprehensive illustration on the citizenship concept. In his work entitled Citizenship and Social Class, he contends that citizenship is a thorough status given to every single member of a society within sovereign areas of a state. With that status, every citizen has obligations to the state, but is also guaranteed basic rights. Based on that understanding, Marshall describes in detail the dimensions of what makes an individual's existence admissible as a citizen, i.e civil citizenship, political citizenship, and social citizenship (Marshall 2009 ).
Civil citizenship is a form of "freedomness" that allows citizens to have their own opinions, express their ideas, embrace certain faiths, pursue their personal goals, and to be treated equally. Meanwhile, political citizenship is formed by the implementation of democratic values, such as the provision of political sites that allow the public to participate in controlling the power, securing the freedom of politics and the establishment of political parties, legal assurance to freedom of the press, and participation in public affairs. The next one is social citizenship, an assurance of social rights fulfillment, including social and welfare protections that are realized through social policies. Social citizenship also becomes the epistemological demarcation between social policy studies and the epistemology of other fields of study related to citizenship studies, which emphasize the civil and political citizenship aspects (Deacon 2007) .
The concept of social citizenship does not appear out of nowhere; its history is embedded in European society's development, which experienced a transformation toward individualism in its communal landscape characteristics as aresult of family dislocation and work relationship, as well as of the dependency over commodification throughout the industrialization period. Along with it, social risks caused by industrializa-tion, such as health, environment, economy, work accidents, etc., are heightened. Consequently, the demand for social risk management also increases. However, it cannot be managed through a community system or kinship because these institutions began to be distant. Meanwhile, if it is managed through a private scheme, it can only be managed as long as the private individual has adequate financial capability. The condition eventually demands a discourse that asserts the only way to avoid every social risk is fulfillment of human rights by the state through social policies funded by either dues or taxes. The state assures, while the citizens contribute. This kind of understanding is called a social contract, which is also the main foundation forthe development of social citizenship discourses (Isin & Turner 2002; Marshall 2009 ).
In a liberal welfare regime, the idea of social citizenship has a logical understanding that falls closer to the concept of market citizenship. This is because the citizens' right to social protection was just granted after the mechanism of market failed to bring welfare, instead of because of a political response to a social risk that occurred as an effect of the market's destructiveness (Mas'udi & Hanif 2011) . This understanding of market citizenship refers to citizens who are defined as independent entities in terms of public goods access (Mulhall & Swift 1992) . The role of the state is only to assure that individual rights to make choices about their lives are fulfilled. According to Rawls (Gaventa & Jones 2000) , in market citizenship, good society can only be achieved through assurance and protection of individual interests, and only if it is released from any individual obstacles.
What is known as rights in market citizenship is the access to fundamental needs and resources instead of social protection as is vital in social citizenship. The right to access is regarded as more important than other fundamental needs and resources. It is based on granting the principle of freedomto each citizen entirely. "Freedomness" provides an opportunity for citizens to fulfil their socioeconomic needs, and to usethem later for achieving individual needs more freely (Putri 2012; Mas'udi & Hanif 2011; Mulhall & Swift 1992) .
Apart from those two constructions of citizenship, which were established in developed countries, there is one construction of citizenship that ischaracteristic of distinguishable social formation in developing countries; that is, communal citizenship. Communal citizenship is often used interchangeably with the term communitarian. The term "communitarian citizens" refers to entities that are connected emotionally, have collective interests, and manage multiple aspects of life collectively to fulfill public goals for society (Etzioni 2011) . The collectivity values are at the core of the communitarian definition. Collectivity becomes the basis of community to act for or in the name of entities, language, religion, gender, ideology, geographical border, diversity of natural resources, etc. (Putri 2012) . The strong character of welfare regime embracing a communitarian ideology is the provision of social policy, which is realized in the form of improving the social community's immunity from many destructive externalities. Examples of this include the programs of community empowerment wherein the recipients are members of a community which is oriented to common virtue instead of individual virtue. Hall and Midgley (2004) see this characteristic as a populist approach in which the method of welfare distribution requires the involvement of citizens with certain identitiesas well as the values included in the implementation of social policy. Table 1 displays a summary of correlations between forms of welfare regime embraced, narrative of social policies implemented, and construction of citizenship discourses provided. 
T H E G E N E A L O G Y OF W E L FA R E R E G I M E I N I N D ON E S I A : A R E F L E C T ION ON C I T I Z E NSH I P DE B AT E S
Returning to the main argument posed at the beginning of this article, which is that the transformation of the Indonesian welfare regime from productivist to universalist has been disrupted by the discourse of communitarian citizenship and market citizenship that have become the typical path of welfare configuration. In order to develop that argument, we must consider the importance of historicity of institutional welfare, which is embedded in the political process and economic system as the historical component that constructed certain values of citizenship (Hall & Taylor 1996) . The institutionalization of a certain value via the political process over years causes its value to tend to be maintained as path-dependent. This circumstance has become an endogenous factor that obstructs innovation within the organization of universal social protection.
Even though the idea to replicate the welfare state in Indonesia as the maximum role of the state over welfare (decommodification) has been written in its constitution, the implementation of that particular idea has come about through a complex dialectic process as the result of Bonapartist politics that also influenced the historical current of welfare distribution practices in Indonesia. Bonapartism eventually changed the direction and goal of the state's welfare development in contemporary Indonesia.
The earliest characteristics of Bonapartism can be identified in the intrigue of the first social insurances cheme, which was targeted at civil servants (Tabungan Asuransi Pegawai Negeri-TASPEN) in 1963. It reflected Sukarno's interest in reinforcing his position with support from civil servants at the edge of his regime (Ramesh 2000; Joedadibrata 2012; Yuda 2018) . Likewise, the emergence of Indonesia's first health insurance, the Agency for Healthcare Funds (Badan Penyelenggara Dana PemeliharaanKesehatan-BPDPK) was established for civil servants and the military a year prior to the major project of the Five Year Plans (Pembangunan Lima Tahun-PELITA). It was then followed by the stipulation of retirement insurance that was targeted to armed forces through Indonesian Armed Forces Social Insurance (Asuransi Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia-ASABRI) in 1973. The establishment of these two institutions (BPDK and ASABRI) can be attributed to the importance of civil servants and military as the key to national stability, and that was the basis of Suharto's regime to maintain the status-quo (Pisani, Kok, & Nugroho 2016) .
After 1977, social protection was expanded to workers in private sectors through Employees Social Insurance (Asuransi Tenaga Kerja-AS-TEK). This period was indeed the most critical juncture of the growth and development of industrialization in Indonesia; it contributed to the improvement of GDP rill's average up to 7,7% each year (Pudjiastuti 2008) as well as simultaneously creating a job market. Politically, AS-TEK's existence can be associated with the government's attempt to muffle the labor unions, which were concentrated in several middle class enterprises after the incident of Malapetaka 15 Januari (Malari) in 1974 (Ramesh 2000) .
The ideological tendency of the welfare arrangement mechanism that is shown in these phases refers to productivist welfare regime as it is implemented in East Asian countries and some nearby countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand (Aspalter 2006; Holiday 2000; Ramesh 2004 ). The characteristics of a productivist welfare regime can be seen in its social welfare articulation constructed in Rostow's logic of economic growth; that is, it has the ability to consume and divert redistributive politics. It can also be identified in Soeharto's social policies' focus on poor households and informal workers, which was integrated via acentered infrastructure establishment, such as the program for leftbehind villages (Inpres Desa Tertinggal-IDT) to cope with problems of infrastructure provision as well as agriculture and food technology development. It was then continued through micro-credit schemes (Kredit Usaha Keluarga Sejahtera-Kukesra) that provided aid to poor households for obtaining venture capital with mild conditions. These programs were formulated to achieve two main functions: first, to boost society in order to improve its productivity and purchasing power so that its citizens could manage their own welfare through a cash nexus; and second, to strengthen the family and certain social groups' immunities in order to respond to the social risks caused by industrialization (Yuda 2018 ) with the intention of easing the state's responsibility for social protection offamilies and other social groups, in case an individual failed to obtain social protection from the market.
The formal social protection for poorer households was just provided in 1992, along with the transformation of two social insurance institutions during Soeharto period. The transformations were BPDPK into PT. ASKES (Health Insurance-Asuransi Kesehatan), followed by ASTEK into Jamsostek (Workers Social Security-Jaminan Sosial Tenaga Kerja) (Yuda 2018) . Under the president's mandate, PT Askes was then asked to begin expanding its reach to the private sector as well as managing the Public Health Maintenance scheme (Jaminan Pemeliharaan KesehatanMasyarakat-JPKM) for poorer households. The extension was an attempt to prevent post-reformation political and economic instability between the 80s-90s (Washington Consensus), which required privatization, tightening of fiscal policy, and deregulation of trade barriers as aneffect of the fall of global oil prices in 1983 (Robison 1986 ).
This period also became the most important juncture in the journey of welfare regime in Indonesia with regard to the institutionalization of the market citizenship's value as the basis of providing social protection. The state withdrew itself by opening space for the market to be involved in social protection; private insurances were established through Act No. 2 of 1992 that allowed life insurance and insurance loss companies to sell health insurance. A year later, the increased growth of private insurance was enabled because of Government Regulation No. 14 of 1993 on Jamsostek, which stipulated an opt out selection, allowing many companies to choose private insurance instead of Jamsostek (Thabrany 2014) .
Shortly after enjoying a long period of economic growth, the monetary crisis struck in almost all Asian regions, including Indonesia. Within one year (1997) (1998) , the currency of the Rupiah toward the American Dollar had dropped as much as 85%, and average domestic prices increased almost 80%. The crisis had almost doubled the percentage of absolute poverty over the previous year, when it was only 14%. As the crisis was aggravated, mass riots happened in Jakarta and other major cities. The crisis wave reached its peak by 1998, with the fall of President Soeharto, who had been president for three decades (Yuda 2018) .
Following the recommendation and guidance from the World Bank, President Habibie introduced the Social Safety Nets plan (Jaring Pengaman Sosial-JPS), which was aimed at recovering purchasing power after the crisis. This JPS program covered several items: (1) subsidized rice distributed monthly to low income families/households with a minimum purchase of 10 Kg; (2) labor-intensive and community empowerment programs to establish infrastructure and micro-credit initiative schemes; (3) education scholarships ranging from US$1 to US$2,5 for each poor household with children as students; and (4) health care.
However, the program was politically and ideologically paradoxical due to its basic idea that it was not meant to fulfill citizens' rights but to 'prepare' human resources for a more open economic system. According to a study conducted by Sumarto (2007) , the JPS program functioned more as an attempt to legitimize the Structural Adjustment Program's (SAP) agenda, which demands political and economic reformation from the centralized system into a market system through privatization, deregulation, liberalization, and of course the gradual revocation of subsidies, up until 2004. Therefore, SAP was the second movement after the economic reformation in the 1980-1990s where in the discourses of market citizenship were massively reinjected and reinstitutionalized, while the discourses of communitarian citizenship were also strengthened through labor-intensive, community-based programs.
SJSN: Mainst reaming of S ocial Citiz enship Discourses
Along with the rise of political parties and interest groups in policymaking, the emergence of the wave of democratization encouraged the initiative to begin a wider welfare program during Abdurahman Wahid's reign (1999) (2000) (2001) . This included the idea of integrating the four existing social security providers (TASPEN, ASABRI, ASKES, and JAM-SOSTEK) into a single administrative body (Wisnu 2012; Thabrany 2008) .
In , President Megawati (2001 validated the law of National Social Security System (Sistem Jaminan Sosial Nasional-SJSN) No. 40 to facilitate the gradual transition of the welfare regime in Indonesia from a productivist model into a universal model. This main idea replicated the ideas of the German corporatist welfare regime (Joedadibrata 2012) with its construction of partial social welfare without any intention of establishing equality. This statement is supported by the fact that SJSN adopted a social class system (classes I, II, and III) in its services. The funding came from: (1) dues from employers and employees in the private sector; (2) the government, which was allocated to pay the premium contributions for civil servants, the military, and low income citizens of Penerima Bantuan Iuran (PBI); and (3) independent contributions from citizens who were not categorized as poor, as civil servants, and as having work relationships with private sectors. Despite the segmentation of social classes, the benefits were based on "need" instead of on contributions.
The transition of welfare regime that was expected to fulfill citizens' social rights eventually had become only a snatch zone of pragmaticpoliticization interests, such as by President Megawati, who was only in- There was also an assumption that launching the BPJS bill would only promote Megawati's popularity as his political rival in election 2009. Meanwhile, the expansion of social policy, especially the ones in the form of unconditional cash transfers, was considered more beneficial for raising political support from constituents.
A year after SBY emerged victorious in the 2009 presidential elections for the second time, civil society and the labor union attempted to revitalize BPJS' bill. They formed an alliance called the Action Committee on Social Security (Komite Aksi Jaminan Sosial-KAJS), which was a coalition of 67 organizations including laborers, farmers, fishermen, students, and academia. On May 1, 2010, KAJS held a rally in Jakarta demanding the implementation of SJSN. The alliance also brought up the issue of BPJS' bill through the court system by filing citizens' demands toward SBY's administration for not implementing SJSN, and calling for an immediate validation of BPJS (Torheim 2013 ). In July 2011, the KAJS team won incourt, which finally forced the government to stipulate the law of BPJS No. 24 of 2011. It became the basis of BPJS' management. "In 2014, BPJS law was implemented through two operational bodies;i.e. BPJS-Kesehatan (1 January 2014) administered the national health insurance (also known as Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional-JKN) for all citizens, whereas BPJS-Ketenagakerjaan (1 July 2014) provided cover for work-related accidents, retirement savings and death benefits for all workers in both private and public sectors" (Yuda 2018:9) .
A few months after Joko Widodo (Jokowi) from the PDI-P party successfully won the 2014 presidential elections, Jokowi's administration (2014-present) politicized BPJS-Kesehatan by exchanging BPJS cards, which were validated by SBY, with JKN-KIS labeled cards, which were actually not substantially different. According to Sumarto (2014) , the act of replacing "flag" through welfare programs was part of the attempt to establish political identity and to support the claim that the ongoing programs were the product of their positive services.
SJSN realized that the discourses of market and communitarian citizenship were strongly dominating compared to those of social citizenship. In other words, the requirements of 'social citizenship' as a sociological foundation for establishing a universal welfare regime were not complete. This statement is strengthened by the fact that the institutional history of welfare during the Soeharto periodre-institutionalized the informal system as management of social protection through a number of community-based programs, and the market system was established by the opening of the private insurance market. This factor contributed to the reason that transformation would be difficult to realize once the policy were initiated. According to Hall dan Taylor (1996) , policies have a direct relationship to the construction of a discourse and paradigm of collective society in any case. Therefore, society's adaptation of communitarian and market discourses, which had been completed during Soeharto's establishment, caused difficulty in implementing institutional re-structurization of universal social protection (Tribowo & Bahagijo 2006) . Along with the implementation of SJSN, the weak current of social citizenship discourses encountered the strong current of market and communitarian discourses, which eventually caused problems in its implementation, which the author discusses in the following section. Prior to that, please see the author's genealogical summary on citizenship discourses within Indonesian social protection in table 2. 
U N I V E R S A L C OV E R AG E : A PROBL E M AT IC C I T I Z E NS H I P
The contradiction of citizenship discourses visualized by the state and the reality that is seen in society has caused problems with SJSN's sustainability. The first problem is that SJSN adopted a German corporatist regime model, as proven by the amount of BPJS dues (BPJS-Kesehatan or BPJS-Ketenagakerjaan) which were designed as static adjustments to the formal work mechanism of industrial society. The government ignored informal sectors with fluctuating income, in addition to 6,2% of others who are recorded as unemployed (Wilmsen, Kaasch, & Sumarto 2016) . Out of 60% of informal laborers, about 50% work in the agriculture sector and live in rural areas (Suryahadi, Febriyani, & Yumna 2014) , which are identical with a shared economic model and hold relatively strong mechanic solidarity. The part that needs to be examined further is, in 2013, a year before BPJS was in effect, out of 114 million Indonesian laborers, only 29,1 million were incorporated into the scheme of JAMSOSTEK (embryo of BPJS-Ketenagakerjaan) (PRAKARSA 2013). Others depended on private insurance or informal schemes. This indicates how low the citizens' belief was in the state's presence as a medium of social protection.
The second problem is the difference ithe definitions of social risks. By replicating the European social protection system, especially the German one, without any modification, the government implicitly assumed that Indonesians have similar risk characteristics as citizens in an industrial economic society, which assumes an identical risk of work accidents. In reality, those who work in the agriculture sector and live in rural areas have the same subsistential economic characteristics that rely on a multifunction system of social protection on a community risksharing basis. Besides, the agricultural society's intensity of interacting with economic activities and modern industry is minimal, especially in harvest time. These individuals need more of an income protection scheme that assures their stable income above the line of poverty in case of crop failure, or to assist them through the waiting period.
The third problem is that, politically, the state's constitution was not strong enough in terms of welfare distribution in the face of familialism and kinship-based institutions that are considered closer to the citizens' preference for welfare assistance. This assumption can be proven by examining Indonesian's tradition of family-based care, whereby it is natural and normal for elders to be taken care of by their descendants; this is also a form of devotion that is related to their ethical and religious codes. This means that it is not easy for the state to suddenly step in to try to promote a formal scheme of old-age pension; most of the citizens have never considered the option as a priority. It is also different when compared to industrial societies in the West, who tend to be individualized and defamilizied sociologically, so the state's offering to manage old-age pension has a much stronger political legitimacy among them.
The last problem not only deals with traditional institutions but also with a state that still has to compete with private institutions. Some of the citizens who work in formal sectors, even government officials, still believe that BPJS-Kesehatan insurance is a complementing force rather than a main one. As Hasbullah Thabrany, an expert in Indonesian health insurance, argues in Kompas (2016): "… officials that manage BPJS consciously don't use BPJS; they have additional insurance. Those officials who manage and handle BPJS themselves claim that BPJS has no quality; therefore they need additional one. The public regulation was designed for citizens, not officials...citizens are just an object, and that means it can be assured that the services are not good."
The opposite is true for the situations of social democratic welfare regime or German corporatist welfare regime that has been referred to SJSN, where the state can compete excellently in providing the best social services to its citizens. It was once portrayed in a documentary film by Michael Moore entitled Sicko, which tells the story of America's health system and compares it with the health systems in the UK, Canada, Cuba, and France. In a sequel, the film succeeded in representing how a cashier at a governmental hospital in the UK did not function as a receiver of payment for hospital bills, but as an assistant in helping pay for patients who cannot afford to pay for transportation from the hospital to their houses. This system was supportedby political representation for the citizens in economic system management and social welfare as well as by the factors of solidarity, universalism, and redistribution values that had become path-dependent in the European welfare state (Gough 2013) .
Another empirical example is the fact that for about three years of BPJS-Kesehatan operation, many citizens who were incorporated into it only paid the dues when they got sick. Consequently, this caused BPJS-Kesehatan to experience deficits three years in a row. The first year was Rp. 3.3 trillion;the second was Rp. 5.85 trillion; and the number kept increasing, eventually reaching Rp. 9.7 trillion in 2016 (Sumarto 2017) . This example indicates that imagination ofthe state's presence is only expected asa complementary institution or alternative when the other "main" institutions, such as family and market, failed to manage the social risks.
The implication of these problems causes SJSN's definition of social citizenship to only reach and benefitsome citizens with certain status (including low class citizens as certified by the government, some laborers in private sectors, a few informal laborers, civil servants, and the military) and excludes the rest, especially those who are not categorized as poor, from receivingthe state's subsidy even though they are not quite "rich" enough to pay the contribution themselves. This particular group of people is the one that is prone to being commodified.
This explanation demonstrates that even though the mainstreaming of social citizenship discourses continues to take place, the substantial definition of social citizenship, such as inclusivity, equity of distributed social rights, and citizens' involvement is not acknowledgeable. First of all, the dichotomy between formal and informal excludes some groups of citizens. Any form of ideal social citizenship must be able to reach all the citizens, despite socio economic status. Second, according to Goodin, distribution of social protection is supposed to achieve equality among citizens (Sumarto 2014 ). Yet the class system, especially within BPJS-Kesehatan, asserts the existence of social stratification among the citizens. Of course, this undermines the redistribution spirit SJSN promotes. The third is the minimal involvement by the citizens, whether as objects or subjects, which is caused by the absence of a social contract between them and the state. Consequently, the state's imagined idea of "social rights fulfillment" within the political practices of welfare distribution conducted by the state can be seen as personification of SJSN with regard to political interests. Meanwhile, the citizens' imagined idea of "willingness" to contribute, along with the domination of communitarian and market citizenship discourses, especially among the middle class, are still embedded in daily society. Therefore, thelogic of "willingness" tends to be more about insurance companies or communities that have long been playing prominent roles in providing welfare, and also have complementary characteristics.
C ONC LUS ION
The objective of this article was to examine how the ideas for realizing social policy on the basis of social citizenship discourse in Indonesia should be reconstructed. The argument is made based on how the transformation of the Indonesian welfare regime from productivist to universalist has been disrupted by the discourses of communitarian and market citizenship that have developed into the path-dependency of welfare configuration. The argument is also supported by three main findings. First, the strength of the welfare systems' non-state institutions in relation to the mainstreaming of market and communitarian citizenship discourses during President Soeharto's New Order period emphasized: a) welfare policies that were segmented among groups of civil servants, military, and high level officials, while communitarian citizenship was injected through schemes of labor-intensive programs toward low-income citizens who needed economic uplifting; and b) social welfare for middle class citizens managed by market design, especially after economic reformation in the 1980-1990s, when the role of private insurance became strongly dominant. These two policy narratives caused social welfare for non-governmental employees to become more commodified, while the state withdrew its responsibility of social protection over informal relations in case citizens failed to obtain welfare from the market. These conditions made mainstreaming of social citizenship discourses difficult to implement without any modification.
Second, among the strengthening discourses on market and communitarian citizenship, this article also shows how discourses on social citizenship were installed through the law of SJSN in 2004, which was later implemented into BPJS-Kesehatan and BPJS-Ketenagakerjaan. The clash between the three currents of citizenship eventually made it impossible for the transformation of welfare regime to reach the ideal form of social citizenship, which demands inclusivity, equity, and active participation by the citizens.
Third, Indonesia has historical differences from Europe, especially Germany, which was the main reference point for social protection development in Indonesia. As discussed earlier, the individualization and defamilialization process that was prevalent in Germany and other European countries, as well as the strength of the countries in subordinating capitalism, had provided the legitimate basis for establishing state-based welfare systems. These preconditions are still absent in Indonesia. Therefore, to assure the sustainability of universal social protection in Indonesia, and to stimulate active citizenship through social contracts instead of merely showing political ambitions, a new mode of governance for the welfare regime is required. By doing so, SJSN can be established upon equality and inclusivity values, so that the implementation of the programs could eventually cover interests and needs for all groups of citizens.
Finally, this article raised important theoretical issues that have a bearing on the development of the approach to welfare regime as well as opening prospects for further studies to explore the dynamics of political sociology as an inseparable part of Indonesia's institutional welfare system. This is especially true with regard to understanding the complexity of the relationship between welfare development and citizenship in the context of developing countries, which are fundamentally different from welfare state regimes in the West.
